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ARTICLES
AGENTS OF CHAOS: JUDICIAL CONFUSION IN
DEFINING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-FREE
SPEECH INTERFACE
Mark S. Lee*
1. INTRODUCTION
Speech is free, but the resources needed to create it cost money. A
constitutional "speaker" may not have that money. Can the speaker take or
use others' property to enable speech? If so, when?
The answer to these questions may seem obvious in many contexts.
Few would argue that a filmmaker could rob a bank to get the money
needed to make a movie. Few would argue that a screenwriter could steal
word processing equipment to write a screenplay. And few would argue
that an artist could walk into a supply store and help herself to the pigments
and oils needed to create a painting.' Although flag burning has been
recognized as constitutionally-protected "speech,",2 it seems unlikely that
the First Amendment would permit one to take Old Glory and burn it, or
even slightly damage it, to enable such speech, because this would infringe
on another's property rights. In other words, these "constitutional"
speakers' First Amendment rights end where another's property rights
begin.
For reasons often not clearly articulated, these questions have proven
more difficult to answer when the property taken is intellectual property.
Constitutional "speakers" often wish to use others' intellectual property to
communicate their "message." An artist might wish to duplicate a
* Intellectual property litigator with Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, representing clients in
the entertainment and high technology industries.
1. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[N]obody would
seriously contend that artistic need would authorize a painter to walk into a supply store and help
himself to whatever he might require.").
2. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990).
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copyrighted photograph to create a new artistic work. A musician might
wish to use someone else's copyrighted poem or samples of earlier music
as the lyrics to or accompaniment for a song. A screenwriter might want to
use a book as the basis for a screenplay. A producer might wish to use a
copyrighted musical composition in the soundtrack of a motion picture or
television commercial, or a trademark or celebrity image in the substance
of that same motion picture or television commercial.
Courts have struggled to accommodate these competing interests in
the intellectual property context.3  Copyright and trademark law have
developed approaches that operate with varying degrees of success.
However, courts have largely failed to fashion clearly-articulable standards
in what is arguably the newest form of intellectual property recognized in
the United States-the right of publicity.4  Despite two United States
Supreme Court decisions and decades of caselaw, the current legal
landscape is a confusing morass of inconsistent, sometimes non-existent, or
mutually exclusive approaches, tests, standards, and guidelines, with the
confusion only increased by several recent rulings.
This Article discusses the various approaches courts have followed to
adjudicate First Amendment defenses to right of publicity claims, evaluates
the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, and suggests standards
that, in the author's view, may help reconcile the competing property and
expressive interests in the context of the right of publicity.
II. PROPERTY AND SPEECH
A. Background Regarding Property
While a clear definition can be elusive, "property" has been described
as "everything which one person can own and transfer to another.",6 It is
"that dominion or indefinite right of user and disposition which one may
lawfully exercise over particular things or objects.",7  It may be
characterized as that which has economic value and the law permits to be
bought and sold.
There are two basic types of property, namely, real property
3. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
6. Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929); see also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (West 1982).
7. Texas Co. v. Hauptman, 91 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1937).
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(involving land and similar real estate) and personal property. "Every kind
of property that is not real is personal." 8 As such, intellectual property is
generally characterized as intangible personal property.
9
Further, the ability to acquire and protect property is one of the
foundations of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and is the bedrock of our
economy. It is impossible to have efficient commerce without a clear
understanding of what property there is to buy and sell, and what may be
done with it.10 Property is protected by the constitutions of the United
States and the states for this reason. Within narrow substantive
restrictions,'' the United States Constitution leaves it to the states to define
what property is,1 2 but several provisions of the Constitution recognize and
protect private property rights once that property has been defined. For
example, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures of private property.' 3  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the taking of property without due process of law. 14 In addition,
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 663 (West 1982).
9. For example, trade secrets have been called "property." Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v.
Moseley, 48 P.2d 9, 12 (Cal. 1944) ("[E]quity will to the fullest extent protect the property rights
of employers in their trade secrets .... ); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, 64 Cal. Rptr.
2d 698, 704 (Ct. App. 1997) ("trade secrets ... [are] a form of intellectual property... "); ITT
Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[Tjrade secrets have
been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible property interest."). Trademarks are
described as personal property. Italian Swiss Colony v. Italian Vineyard Co., 110 P. 913, 915
(Cal. 1910) ("[R]elief is granted ... because a right of property-i.e., plaintiffs exclusive right to
the use of his trademark-has been invaded."); Hall v. Holstrom, 289 P. 668, 671 (Cal. 1930) ("A
trademark or design... is property, and is therefore susceptible to private ownership."); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 655 (West 1982) (stating that trademarks are property because they may be owned).
Common law copyrights are "property." See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (Cal. 1956)
(noting that "common law protects... a property right... "); Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 256 P.2d
947, 956 (Cal. 1953) ("California now accepts the traditional theory of protectible property under
common law copyright.").
10. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1257, 1259 (1998) (discussing the need for initial distribution of property rights as a
prerequisite to Internet commerce); see also Julia E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyperspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management, " 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 492-95 (1998).
11. In rare circumstances, substantive constitutional limitations, such as the First
Amendment, equal protection guarantees, and the concept of substantive due process, will restrict
the ability of either state or federal governments to limit rights in property. See Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (concluding that the government could not define or enforce
rights in real property as contingent on the property's not being granted to racial minorities).
12. The U.S. Constitution contains no definition of "property," with most Supreme Court
authority focusing on when government entitlements create "property" interests. See, e.g., Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Id. amends. V, XV.
2003)
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state constitutions routinely articulate specific property rights. 15
This does not mean that private property is legally sacrosanct. A
taking of private property by the state is permitted, for example, upon a
showing of probable cause that the property may evidence a crime.
16
Eminent domain proceedings also permit the taking of private property so
long as proper compensation is paid.'7 Further, use of private property can
be restricted in certain circumstances by zoning or other laws without
qualifying as a "taking" under the Constitution.'
8
However, all of these restrictions on private property are only
exercisable by the state, after appropriate administrative, legislative, or
judicial procedures. 19 No statute or constitutional provision permits a
private party to take another's property, even when the party justifies the
taking to exercise a perceived right. To the contrary, elaborate mechanisms
have been created to prevent such conduct, by punishing the perpetrators
and compensating the victims. 20  In particular, theft, robbery, burglary,
embezzlement, larceny, and extortion, which involve the unauthorized
private taking of others' property, are crimes. Additionally, their civil
equivalents-trespass, conversion, negligence, fraud, and other torts-
permit an individual whose property has been damaged, interfered with, or
misappropriated to obtain equitable relief to stop the interference and/or
recover damages. Thus, the state can, in certain circumstances, take one's
property through proceedings that comply with due process, while a private
party cannot, except through successful litigation.
B. Background Regarding "Free Speech"
The right to speak is embodied in the First Amendment. 21 Although
two centuries of jurisprudence have recognized that speech is a cornerstone
of a vibrant democracy,22 there is sometimes confusion about what it is.
Some have advocated relatively strict definitions of speech that would limit
First Amendment protection to political speech and artistic expression.
2 3
15. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I (recognizing that all persons have the inalienable right to
acquire, possess, and protect property).
16. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571-74 (1978).
17. Contributors to Pa. Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1917); see also
discussion supra note 9.
18. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,125 (1978).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 461, 505, 530.7, 13848 (West 1997).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
23. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
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However, courts have accepted that broad categories of information and
conduct can qualify as "speech" for First Amendment purposes.24
Although speech is "free," engaging in it sometimes has a legal cost.
Many crimes or torts traditionally have not been deemed to be protected by
the First Amendment, even if they embody "speech., 25  There is no
constitutional right to make fraudulent misrepresentations, even though
such misrepresentations are usually made through "speech. 26 There is no
constitutional right to solicit murder or offer a bribe to a public official,
even though these crimes are "speech".27 There is no constitutional right to
tell someone how to build a bomb28 or violate tax laws.29 While burning
one's own flag can be "speech," as described above, burning someone
else's property to "communicate" unhappiness with the property owner
would not be protected by the First Amendment's free speech provisions.
3
0
Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence generally evaluates the
nature of the speech or the nature of the restriction on the speech to
determine whether the speech can properly be deemed illegal.3' "Pure"
speech generally receives the highest degree of First Amendment
protection. It can be inhibited only if there is a compelling state interest
and the state does so by the least restrictive means available. 32  This is
sometimes called the "strict scrutiny" test.33
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (stating that First Amendment protection should be limited to political
speech); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REv. 73, 77 (1996) (asserting that the First
Amendment should apply to artistic expression).
24. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("The First Amendment protects works
which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value .... ); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (The First Amendment applies to "[a]ll ideas having
even slightest redeeming social importance" including "'the advancement of truth, science,
morality and arts in general ....') (citation omitted).
25. See, e.g., N. Y Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 1309,
1312-13 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Nordyke v. Santa Clara County, 110 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir.
1997).
26. See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88.
27. Levi Strauss, 121 F.3d at 1312-13 (The First Amendment does not protect verbal offers
to sell counterfeit merchandise because "the underlying transaction is illegal.").
28. United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 322 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
communicative value of a well-placed bomb in the Capitol does not entitle it to the protection of
the First Amendment.").
31. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
32. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
33. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) ("For noncommercial speech entitled
to full First Amendment protection, a content-based regulation is valid under the First
Amendment only if it can withstand strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be narrowly
2003]
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However, even pure speech can be regulated without "strict scrutiny"
review if the restriction is "content neutral., 34  "Content neutral"
restrictions receive an intermediate level of review.35 "A regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.,36  Content-neutral regulation of speech is acceptable "if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that [governmental] interest., 37 "[S]o
long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation," content-neutral
restriction on speech is permissible, though the regulation may not "burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests.,
38
Restrictions on "commercial speech" also receive lessened judicial
scrutiny.39  "Commercial speech" is generally defined as truthful, non-
misleading speech that predominantly "propose[s] a commercial
transaction." 40  The government can regulate commercial speech if the
regulation is intended to advance a substantial government interest and
does not unnecessarily burden the ability to communicate the commercial
41message .
C. Free Speech and Use of Others' Property
Although they have not always discussed the issue in these terms,
U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the free speech-private property
interface have generally ruled that the First Amendment does not permit the
use of another's property to engage in speech against the property owner's
will.42 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner43 held that political leafletters had no federal
free speech rights in a privately-owned shopping mall, stating "[i]t would
tailored (that is, the least restrictive means) to promote a compelling government interest.").
34. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
35. Id. at 798-800. "So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the government's interest.., the regulation will not be invalid." Id. at 800.
36. Id. at 791; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707-08, 725-26 (2000) (upholding a
statute with police guidelines restricting access to healthcare centers by demonstrators).
37. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
38. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
39. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
40. Id. at 66 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976)).
41. Id. at 68-69.
42. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
43. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield
to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist." 4  Hudgens v.
National Labor Relations Boardt 5 expanded on Lloyd Corp. and held that
the First Amendment did not require a privately-owned shopping center to
permit picketing on its premises because the right to own private property
encompassed the right to prohibit unwanted speech.46  The only
circumstance in which real property can be used to promote speech under
the U.S. Constitution is when the private property has been granted rights
so extensive that it, in effect, serves a governmental function and operates
as a public forum.47 In that event, it can be subject to the same
constitutional restrictions as a government-owned public forum.48
However, state statutes or constitutional provisions, consistent with states'
general ability to define property, may nevertheless afford additional access
to property to effectuate speech under the states' police power.49
The Supreme Court has also been respectful of intellectual property
rights in the face of First Amendment defenses. For example, it held that a
magazine article's use of 300 to 400 words from a 200,000-word book
violated the copyright in the book and rejected an argument that the
newsworthy value of the article gave it constitutional protection under the
First Amendment.5 ° It held that a television station which broadcast a
human cannonball's act during the evening news violated the performer's
right of publicity, rejecting a First Amendment argument in the process. 5'
44. Id. at 567.
45. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
46. Id. at 520-21.
47. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-09 (1946) (holding that a "company town"
with no formal ties to any state agency or authority could not prohibit religious leafletting in
privately owned business district sidewalks because the business district served a "public
function").
48. Id.
49. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Lloyd did not preclude the State of California from requiring
owners of a shopping center to permit peaceful leafletting on shopping center property pursuant
to the state constitution's free speech provisions). The California Supreme Court later clarified
that, even under California law, private property may be used to effectuate speech only where
there is both state action and the property has become a public forum. See Golden Gateway Ctr.
v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the Tenants
Association did not have free speech rights to distribute newsletters in a privately-owned
residential apartment complex that was not open to the public under California's Constitution
because the actions of the owners were not state actions and the apartment building's hallway was
not a "public forum").
50. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
51. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
2003]
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It affirmed the U.S. Olympic Committee's exclusive statutory right to the
"Olympic" mark, rejecting a political speech argument in doing so. 52 How
the Supreme Court arrived at those results will be discussed below.
III. BACKGROUND REGARDING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Though it has important antecedents in unfair competition,
misappropriation, and fraud, and is historically linked to privacy, the "right
of publicity" was first recognized in 1953 in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 53 when the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that baseball players had a right to stop the unauthorized
commercial appropriation of their likenesses and playing statistics on
baseball cards.54 Haelan was the start of a judicial and legislative
movement recognizing an economic right in one's identity separate and
apart from the right of privacy or other analogous tort.55  The right of
publicity recognizes that, in the culture of celebrity, an individual's name
and likeness can have significant commercial value that will be harmed by
the unauthorized and uncontrolled commercial exploitation of others. 56 It
has been described as "property" in both statute and caselaw.5 7
A creature of state law, the right of publicity is now widely
52. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987).
53. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
54. Id. at 869.
55. Interestingly, the baseball cards' inclusion of playing statistics undoubtedly served an
"expressive" purpose within the First Amendment. The Haelan court nevertheless did not rule
that the First Amendment protected such expression; if it had, the right of publicity might never
have developed. The expressive content of baseball cards apparently found unimportant in
Haelan was later found more important to other courts. See Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 307 (Ct. App. 2001).
56. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) ("A famous individual's
name, likeness, and endorsement carry value, and an unauthorized use harms the person both by
diluting the value of the name and depriving that individual of compensation."); Matthews v.
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the right of publicity allows a
person to prevent dilution of the goodwill that has been created in his or her image.); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.3 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that "the value of
associating the celebrity's name with a particular product will be diminished if others are
permitted to use the name in association with their products").
57. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Waits' voice
misappropriation claim is one for invasion of a personal property right: his right of publicity to
control the use of his identity as embodied in his voice") (emphasis added); Michaels v. Internet
Entm't Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 838 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("[A] celebrity's property interest in his
name and likeness is unique....") (emphasis added); Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Reeboans, 852 F.
Supp. 875, 879-80 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that dilution and right of publicity claims involve
property rights); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 1997) ("[T]he rights recognized under this
section are property rights, freely transferable, in whole or in part .... ").
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recognized throughout the United States, and the trend is to recognize such
a right on common law or statutory grounds.58  About thirty-six states
recognize some variant of the right, and nineteen have applied it
posthumously; in contrast, no state has refused to apply the right to living
individuals, and only two states arguably refuse to apply it posthumously.
59
Forty years of judicial and legislative effort have produced a nationally-
recognized, reasonably-defined right of publicity that protects the economic
value of identity.
60
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
There has always been a tension between the expressive rights
embodied in the First Amendment and the property rights embodied in
intellectual property laws. All persons who create works can argue that any
inhibition on their free taking of others' intellectual property chills speech
by increasing the cost of creating works. 61 However, granting free use of
others' intellectual property to communicate a message also chills speech,
since it chills the creation of intellectual property in the first instance and
58. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 9.5 (2d.
ed. 2002) (noting that the trend and majority rule is recognizing that the right of publicity does
last after death and has a post-mortem duration of some period); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. h (1993) ("Of those jurisdictions that have determined the issue
through legislation or common law adjudication, the majority recognize the [publicity] right as
descendible ... ").
59. See MCCARTHY, supra note 58, § 9.5[A]; Smith v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med.
Ctr., 499 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (App. Div. 1986); Hagen v. Dahmer, 24 Med. L. Rptr. 1311, 1314
(C.D. Wis. 1995). Two other states with earlier reported decisions that could be construed to
deny a right of publicity, Ohio and Illinois, recently enacted legislation to create statutory
posthumous publicity rights. See Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/20
(1993); see also S.54, 123rd Gen. Assem. (Ohio 1999). Washington state and Pennsylvania
recently enacted right of publicity statutes as well. See 1998 Wash. Legis. Serv. 274 (West); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 8312 (1978).
60. In response to the judicial and legislative trend of recognizing the right of publicity, a
few commentators have attacked the fundamental tenets of the right. These attacks appear to
stem from a discomfort with the economic value our culture places on celebrity, as well as the
broader "critical studies" movement, which commentators argue has unjustifiably developed legal
concepts designed to protect the middle class. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 853, 869-71 (1995).
61. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the right of publicity should not exist because
it "suppresses" creative works by requiring authors to obtain permission to use others' identities
in such works. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 134 (1993). Identical arguments could be made about
copyrights, trademarks, patents, and all other intellectual property rights, since all similarly
"suppress" derivative works. Indeed, identical arguments could be made about all property
rights, since all theoretically "suppress" speech by requiring speakers to obtain the property
owner's permission to use that property in speech.
2003]
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intellectual property itself often consists of speech.62  Allowing
uncompensated third-party use also devalues the property and allows unjust
enrichment in violation of the owner's property rights.63 Thus, courts have
had to determine how to accommodate these competing constitutional
interests.
One court noted that "the[F]irst [A]mendment is not a license to
trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property," 64 since
otherwise, one could always utilize another's intellectual property on free
speech grounds without liability for infringement, and virtually wipe out
copyright, trademark, right of publicity, and other intellectual property
laws.6 5 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court and every other court to
consider the issue have rejected the argument that a free speech claim
automatically immunizes conduct that infringes intellectual property
rights.6 6
Recognizing that there cannot be absolute free speech immunity for
taking others' intellectual property, courts have developed different
approaches to reconcile the expressive and property interests at issue.67
Approaches utilized in copyright and trademark law are summarized below
to give context.
62. See Alison P. Howard, A Fistful of Lawsuits: The Press, the First Amendment, and
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 88 CAL. L. REV. 127, 161, 162-63 (2000).
63. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983).
64. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188
(5th Cir. 1979) (affirming a preliminary injunction barring trademark and copyright infringement
despite a First Amendment parody defense).
65. See Howard, supra note 62, at 159-60, 162.
66. 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment did not insulate
defendants from liability for violating plaintiff's right of publicity in newscast any more than it
would for copyright infringement); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the First Amendment parody defense did not bar a right of publicity
claim: "unless the first amendment bars all right of publicity actions-and it does not.., then it
does not bar this case"); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, Inc., 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("Balducci argues it has an absolute First Amendment right to use plaintiff's
trademarks in its parody. No such absolute right exists."); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40,
49 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989) (holding that "[t]rademark protection is not
lost simply because the allegedly infringing use is in connection with a work of artistic
expression"). A leading authority on the right of publicity has stated:
When a defendant is making a confusing use of another's trademark on a product
like a coffee mug, a claim of First Amendment immunity for conveying a
"message"--whether it be criticism of the trademarked product, condemnation of
some social evil, or just parody-rings hollow. A coffee mug is not the normal or
traditional medium for "speech" on public issues.
MCCARTHY, supra note 58, § 31:152.
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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A. Copyright Law
The Supreme Court recently affirmed that there is no First
Amendment right to copy others' copyrighted works.6 8 Copyright law
accommodates expressive interests through its "idea/expression
dichotomy" and a "fair use" analysis.69 It protects only the particular
expression of facts or ideas, not the facts or ideas themselves. 70 Thus, the
ability to speak on, with, or about the ideas in expressive works is honored.
Initially developed by caselaw,7' the fair use doctrine is now codified
in the Copyright Act.72 It generally holds that certain uses of copyrighted
works, such as educational uses, criticism, news reporting, etc. should be
deemed "fair" and not a violation of copyright law. To determine whether
the taking of some or all of another's copyrighted work is a "fair use,"
courts are required to evaluate:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the affect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.7 3
These statutory factors are something of an empty suit because courts
are told to "weigh" them without guidance on how to do so. Caselaw has
attempted to fill these statutory gaps with uneven success.74 The fair use
doctrine, nevertheless, is the most clearly articulated approach to
68. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 789 (2003) ("The First Amendment securely protects
the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches.").
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir.
1999) (noting that "[w]e have repeatedly rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions
from copyright infringement on the ground that First Amendment concerns are protected by and
coextensive with the fair use doctrine"); L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir.
1992) ("First Amendment concerns are also addressed in the copyright field through the 'fair use'
doctrine;" idea/expression dichotomy "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author's expression.") "No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates."
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 556.
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
71. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that a
parody's commercial nature is only one element to be weighed).
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reconciling property and speech interests in the intellectual property field.75
That does not mean it is popular or its application is predictable. It
has been widely criticized for decades. Characterized by one court as "so
flexible as virtually to defy definition," 76 an appellate judge famously
described copyright's fair use doctrine as "the most troublesome in the
whole law of copyright, '77 while a leading copyright commentator
characterized fair use as a "most obscure doctrine., 78 This uncertainty has
made the fair use doctrine a heavily litigated aspect of copyright law.
B. Trademark Law
Copyright's fair use doctrine may be "troublesome," but it is a model
of unified clarity compared to the approaches utilized in trademark
infringement and unfair competition actions. Courts have applied a number
of inconsistent methods to competing trademark and free speech claims,
splintering both among and within federal circuits in the approach they
follow.
1. The "Alternative Means" Test
Early panels of the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adopted an
"alternative means of communication" test, pursuant to which non-
commercial speech is held infringing if there is another way to convey the
message without infringing intellectual property rights.7 9  Those courts
75. See id.
76. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geiss Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
77. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
78. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1963).
Nimmer elsewhere cites a cartoon depicting a young lawyer who climbs to the top of a mountain
to ask a guru the ultimate unanswerable question: It is not, "What is the meaning of life?", but
rather, "What is 'fair use'?" See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION 367 (3d ed. 1985).
79. See, e.g., Int'l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir.
1986), aff'd 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding "political speech" defense to statutory "Olympic"
trademark infringement claim lacked merit because defendants had other ways to communicate
their message); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding t-
shirt with phrase "Mutant of Omaha" printed on it infringed trademarks, and rejecting First
Amendment defense under the "alternative means of communication" test); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting First
Amendment argument and holding that use of Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders uniforms in film
constituted trademark infringement under "alternative means" standard); Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1571-73 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd on other grounds,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that potentially confusing use of trademarks in a book not
protected by First Amendment because "[w]here alternative means of achieving the satiric or
parodic ends exist that would not entail confusion, the First Amendment will not protect the
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adopted this approach because they believed it best comports with U.S.
Supreme Court authority discussing incidental "time, place and manner"
restrictions on speech in analogous property settings.80
The Supreme Court appeared to support this approach in a ruling that
affirmed one of the panel decisions. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee81 involved an organization ("SFAA")
that sponsored and promoted an event called the "Gay Olympic Games. 82
The SFAA used the word "Olympic" in the title of its event, in advertising
for the event, and on ancillary merchandise such as t-shirts, buttons, and
bumper stickers it sold to fund the event.83 The United States Olympic
Committee ("USOC") sued the SFAA on the grounds that it owned an
exclusive statutory right to prohibit certain commercial and promotional
use of the word "Olympic," regardless of whether the work was used in a
confusing manner.
84
The SFAA sought to defend its conduct on the grounds that, inter
alia, its use of "Olympic" was "political speech" protected by the First
Amendment.85 Both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the First Amendment argument,86 with the Ninth Circuit relying on
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. to hold that there was no
First Amendment defense "[b]ecause SFAA had satisfactory alternative
means for expressing its opposition to the Olympics ....,87
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but rejected the "political
speech" argument.88 In language echoing the "alternative means" standard
utilized by the Ninth Circuit and articulated in the Supreme Court's own
earlier Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner decision, it stated:
By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes,
neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SFAA from
conveying its message .... Section 110 restricts only the
parodist from being held to infringe").
80. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972) (noting that "[i]t would be an
unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First
Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication
exist"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (discussing time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech).
81. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
82. Id. at 525.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 526 (citing 36 U.S.C. § 308).
85. Id. at 535.
86. Int'7 Olympic Comm., 781 F.2d at 737.
87. Id. (relying on Zacchini).
88. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 535-36.
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manner in which the SFAA may convey its message. The
restrictions on expressive speech properly are characterized as
incidental to the primary Congressional purpose of encouraging
and rewarding the USOC's activities. The appropriate inquiry is
thus whether the incidental restrictions on First Amendment
freedoms are greater than necessary to further a substantial
governmental interest ....
The SFAA's expressive use of the word [Olympic] cannot be
divorced from the value the USOC's efforts have given to it.
The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed
to a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First
Amendment right to "appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those
who have sown ... ." The USOC's right to prohibit use of the
word "Olympic" in the promotion of athletic events is at the
core of its legitimate property right.8
Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly found that restrictions on
expressive uses of trademarks were "content neutral" regulations,9" which
received only an intermediate level of review. Although the Court was less
clear in articulating precisely what type of intermediate review was
appropriate, 91 by establishing an intermediate level of review and affirming
the Ninth Circuit's "alternative means" approach, the Court implied
acceptance of such an approach to reconciling intellectual property and free
speech rights.92
One might have thought that these decisions would have resolved the
issue. However, despite the appellate and Supreme Court decisions cited
above, no appellate court has applied the "alternative means" approach
since 1987, the year of the SFAA decision. 93 Instead, subsequent courts
have applied other approaches, as described below.
2. Balancing
In 1989, a panel of the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi was
again faced with the trademark-free speech issue when Ginger Rogers sued
89. Id. at 536-37, 541 (citations and footnotes omitted).
90. Id. at 561 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. The Supreme Court cited with approval the "time, place and manner restrictions" test
applied in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), while at the same time borrowing
language from commercial speech cases. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 535-37.
Footnote 16 goes so far as to state that the application of either test to the facts before it was
"substantially similar," and thus discussed them together. Id. at 537 n.16.
92. Id. at 548.
93. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989).
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over a movie about two Italian dancers entitled Ginger and Fred.
94
Disposing of the above authority with a short observation that the "no
alternative avenues" test was insufficiently protective of expressive
interests, 95 the court announced an ad hoc balancing test in which one is to
weigh competing expressive and property interests according to
unspecified criteria.96  The Rogers court concluded that the expressive
interests outweighed Ms. Rogers' property interest because, although the
film was not about Fred Astaire or Ginger Rogers, the title had an "artistic
relevance" to its subject matter.97
Perhaps because balancing implies fairness and describes in the
broadest sense what a court in this area must do, the "balancing" approach
has recently proven popular with appellate courts. The two most recent
appellate decisions addressing these issues in the trademark setting have
followed it.98 However, the approach presents several problems.
First, the "balancing" test is arguably inconsistent with Supreme
Court authority as described above. 99 Some courts have recognized that
inconsistency.' 00
Second, the "balancing" approach is ultimately unsupported by
authority. Rogers cites no authority to support the approach it develops; to
the contrary, it acknowledged the Supreme Court's Lloyd Corp. decision
and its "no alternative avenues" test, but declined to follow it, and barely
mentions and does not follow the San Francisco Arts & Athletics decision
issued only two years before.'01
Third, the approach is not limited by any meaningful evaluative
guidelines or criteria, and amounts to little more than a Rorschach test for a
particular judge's philosophical predilections. It has been criticized by
94. Id. at 996-97.
95. Id. at 999 ("[T]his 'no alternative' standard provides insufficient leeway for literary
expression .... [T]he 'no alternative avenues' test does not sufficiently accommodate the
public's interest in free expression .... "). The Rogers court noted that it "need not consider
whether Congress could constitutionally bar the use of all literary titles that are to any extent
misleading." Id. at 1000 n.7. Therefore, the court felt it was unnecessary to consider the
Supreme Court's decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics. Id.
96. Id. at 999.
97. Id. at 1001.
98. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664 (5th Cir. 2000);
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1571-72 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
Rogers' "balancing" test is "sui generis" as applied to noncommercial speech, given that the
Supreme Court has only applied a lower standard of protection to commercial speech).
101. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998-1000 & n.7; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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leading commentators in the copyright and trademark fields for these
reasons. 10 2 Judicial application confirms the propriety of these criticisms.
Courts "balancing" intellectual property rights have either applied criteria
that are not amenable to case-by-case determination or have arrived at
inconsistent results.0 3
Finally, ad hoc "balancing" itself can chill speech by creating legal
uncertainty as to whether the speech is or is not permitted. As the
California Supreme Court noted:
[A]nalysis focusing on relevance allows courts and juries to
decide most cases ... without balanc[ing] interests in an ad hoc
fashion in each case. The articulation of standards that do not
require ad hoc resolution of the competing interest in
each ... case... is favored in areas affecting First Amendment
rights, because the relative predictability of results reached
under such standards minimizes the inadvertent chilling of
protected speech, and because standards that can be applied
objectively provide a stronger shield against the unconstitutional
punishment of unpopular speech.104
3. The "Likelihood of Confusion" Standard
After Rogers, panels of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in the late 1990s
applied traditional "likelihood of confusion" analysis to First Amendment
defenses to Lanham Act claims. 105 Citing neither the "alternative means"
nor "balancing" authority described above, those decisions apparently
premised their analysis on the proposition that there is no constitutional
right to engage in misleading speech. 0 6  They evaluated potentially
102. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.02 (1984).
103. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970-
72 (10th Cir. 1996) (balancing free speech rights with property rights); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-
1001 (holding that under the "balancing" approach, use of Ginger Rogers' name and title of film
about Italian dancers protected free expression because title artistically related to subject of
films); American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734-35 (D.
Minn. 1998) (holding that the use of the "Dairy Queen" trademark in title of film about
Minnesota beauty pageant contestants was not protected free expression because title was not
artistically related to subject of film).
104. Shuman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997);
see also Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1998).
106. Id.; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563-64, 566 (1980) (holding no First Amendment protection for misleading commercial
speech).
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confusing uses of a mark under "likelihood of confusion" factors regardless
of the "media" used, whether traditionally "expressive" media such as
books, or traditionally "commercial" media such as advertisements.
10 7
This approach has the advantage of being intuitive, straightforward,
and easy to apply. Under it, confusing speech is unprotected speech.10 8 In
many circumstances, this is consistent with "commercial speech" doctrine,
since trademarks are most often used in advertising or other traditional
commercial speech settings. 109 Indeed, one could argue that any speech
that misleads as to commercial source or origin is "commercial speech."' 10
It also appears consistent with analogous caselaw prohibiting fraudulent,
deceptive, or otherwise harmful speech." However, some courts have
found it insufficiently protective of First Amendment interests, as described
above and below.
4. Constitutional "Malice"
A California appellate court and two panels from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals have applied defamation's "actual malice" test to actions
that included unfair competition claims. 1 2 Defamation or related claims
were also asserted in the Eastwood decisions, and both held that the
standard was satisfied." 3 Those courts' use of the "malice" standard to the
unfair competition claims might be viewed as coincidental to their
107. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1405-06 (affirming a preliminary injunction
against potentially confusing use of marks in a book and rejecting First Amendment "parody"
defense).
108. See id. at 1403 n.l 1.
109. See generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 859, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
("A trademark is a word, phrase or symbol that is used to identify a manufacturer or sponsor of a
good or the provider of a service.").
110. See generally Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) ("[T]he speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented... even a
communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the
coverage of the First Amendment.")
111. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
112. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2001)
(reversing judgment for Dustin Hoffman on unfair competition and right of publicity claims
arising out of use of a photograph in a magazine because insufficient evidence of "malice"); see
generally Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting judgment for Clint
Eastwood, affirmed on defamation, false association, right of privacy, and right of publicity
claims because defendants knew statements were false when they made them; First Amendment
defense rejected); Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 351-52 (Ct. App. 1983)
(applying the actual malice test to defamation and right of publicity for commercial purposes).
113. Nat'l Enquirer, 123 F.3d at 1250, 1256; Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. at
351-52 (holding that while Eastwood failed to include claim that the article was published with
reckless disregard for falsity, such defect was capable of being cured by amending his pleading).
2003]
488 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:471
judicially-mandated application of "malice" to defamation claims.
However, one Ninth Circuit panel has applied the "actual malice" standard
in an unfair competition action that lacked a defamation claim. 14 It did so
without distinguishing, or even mentioning, earlier caselaw from the same
circuit that applied other standards in similar unfair competition actions.'
1 5
C. Right of Publicity Law
In the right of publicity setting, trademark law's unsatisfying
splintering of analytic methodologies has only intensified. Lacking even
the grounding of trademark law's "likelihood of confusion" requirements,
courts faced with right of publicity-free speech issues have borrowed or
invented varying methodologies to address them.
1. The "Merchandise v. Media" Result
Although difficult to logically support as a "test" or "approach,"
historically, most courts rejected First Amendment defenses to right of
publicity claims involving traditional "merchandise," i.e., items such as t-
shirts, posters, games, buttons, or bumper stickers, 1 6 while they accepted it
when an image was used in traditional "media."
There often is little articulation of the policies underlying this
rejection in those decisions, but the courts, which do explain their
reasoning, state that merchandise is not a meaningful expression of ideas.'
1 7
114. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186-87.
115. Id. (applying malice test to unfair competition claim arising out of use of image in
magazine article). Cf Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1404 (applying likelihood of confusion
analysis to unfair competition claim arising out of use of trademarked images in book).
116. Such rejection arguably is proper even if the merchandise might have some expressive
value. "[I]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes... but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the
First Amendment." Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (holding that ballroom dancing is
not protected by the First Amendment).
117. For example, Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 603 P.2d 454, 462-64 (Cal.
1979), held that use of a celebrity's name and likeness in a fictionalized biography of the celebrity
did not infringe the plaintiff's right of publicity because the television program was a form of
expression protected by the First Amendment. However, the concurring opinion distinguished
Guglielmi from a companion case, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) as
follows:
Lugosi involved the use of Bella Lugosi's likeness in connection with the sale of
such commercial products as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target
games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods .... These objects, unlike
motion pictures, are not vehicles through which ideas and opinions are regularly
disseminated .... This case involves the use of a celebrity's identity in a
constitutionally protected medium of expression, a work of fiction on film.
Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 463--64 (citations omitted). Yet the dissenting opinion in Lugosi noted
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For these courts, the medium really is the message. Use in a recognized
"medium of expression" is apparently thought to have an exclusively, or at
least predominantly, expressive meaning deserving First Amendment
protection, while use in "merchandise" is thought to exclusively or
predominantly exploit the commercial value of the celebrity." 8  To
synthesize a formulation not expressed in any of these decisions, products
which predominantly sell a celebrity are seemingly deemed unprotectable
merchandise; products which predominantly sell comment about a celebrity
are arguably deemed protected speech." 19
Courts adopting this approach have ruled that sales of merchandise by
non-news organizations that infringe publicity rights are not protected by
the First Amendment, even if the merchandise "commemorates" an event,
and even if some "expressive" information is contained on or in the
products which exploit the celebrity, because the dominant purpose of the
merchandise is to commercially exploit the goodwill of, rather than make
an expressive comment about the celebrity.1
20
that "this unauthorized exploitation of plaintiffs proprietary interest in these commercial
merchandising products is no more insulated from suit by the Constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression than Universal's refusal to pay Lugosi for his services in portraying Count
Dracula in Dracula would be." Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 434, 449 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
118. A few courts have gone even further and have found uses of a celebrity's persona in
potentially "expressive" media infringing where the primary purpose of the use was to
commercially exploit, rather than to communicate information about the celebrity. See, e.g.,
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aft'd, 579 F.2d 215, 222
(2d Cir. 1978) (The sale of a "memorial poster" of Elvis Presley with the words "In Memory,
1935-77" was not protected by the First Amendment--"no constitutional protection for selling
posters of Elvis Presley as Elvis Presley"); Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F.
Supp. 485, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting
defendant's argument that a play featuring impersonators of the Marx Brothers was a protected
parody under the First Amendment because "the play does not present a parody on their parody,
but instead successfully reproduced the Marx Brothers' own style of humor"); Estate of Elvis
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that a live theatrical
presentation of concert designed to imitate a performance of the late Elvis Presley infringed
publicity rights and was not protected under the First Amendment); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that an unauthorized drawing of a nude man in
magazine recognizable as Mohammed Ali violated right of publicity and not protected free
speech).
119. Hoffinan, 255 F.3d at 1186-87.
120. See, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 85-86, 88 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that a non-advertising poster inside a magazine is a commercial product that can
trigger right of publicity liability despite "newsworthy" information on the poster); NFL Props. v.
Playoff Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1992) ("Purchasers, while buying a Sports
Illustrated primarily for newsworthy information, would be likely to buy Defendants' [products]
for possible appreciation value and for their ability to trade .... Defendants' First Amendment
defense does not mitigate against a finding of likelihood of success on the merits .... );
Brockum v. Blalock, 725 F. Supp. 438, 444-46 (E.D. PA 1990) (holding that "event" t-shirts that
were allegedly intended to "commemorate" a musical tour violated publicity rights and not
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This approach achieves a certain rough justice in many circumstances,
which may explain its historical popularity. However, its obvious
conceptual shortcomings have rendered it vulnerable to First Amendment
attack. The fact is, the First Amendment does not limit its protections to
speech in "recognized media." Many courts have sought a more logically-
supportable approach with which to reconcile competing right of publicity
and First Amendment interests for this reason.
2. The Zacchini Decision
The United States Supreme Court issued a ruling in a decision
involving the right of publicity-free speech interface in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.121 Zacchini involved a local television station
that recorded a human cannonball's act without his permission and
broadcast it on the evening news. 22  He alleged violation of his right of
publicity, and the television station claimed its news broadcast was
protected speech. 123 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision for
the television station, 24 but the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs interest in protecting the economic value of his
protected speech); Beverley v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr,, 532 N.Y.S.2d 400, 400 (1988)
(ruling that a calendar that included unauthorized photograph of plaintiff violated right of
publicity even if the photograph also served an educational or informative purpose); Bi-Rite
Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (deciding that
posters, buttons, patches, bumper stickers, and other novelty items bearing images of rock
musicians infringed their rights of publicity); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp.
1201, 1214 (N.D. I11. 1981) (holding that t-shirts which infringe trademark and publicity rights
are not protected by First Amendment); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div.
1981) (holding that an unauthorized poster of model Christie Brinkley violated her right of
publicity; summary judgment granted); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 347
N.Y.S.2d 83, 83 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (rejecting argument that sale of merchandise bearing the name
and image of Howard Hughes protected by the First Amendment and granting summary judgment
on right of publicity claim); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1973),
modified and affd, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973) (rejecting argument that board game with
name and likeness of Howard Hughes was a "medium of free speech" and granting summary
judgment on right of publicity theory); Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn.
1970) (rejecting First Amendment argument and holding that board game that used the names and
statistics of hundreds of baseball players violated their rights of publicity); Palmer v. Schonhorn
Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (holding that a board game that
utilized the names and images of Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and other golfers was not a
protected form of free expression and that defendants were liable for violating plaintiffs rights of
publicity).
121. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
122. Id. at 563-64.
123. Id. at 564 (holding that despite television station's general privilege to report matters of
legitimate public interest petitioner nevertheless alleged a violation of right of publicity).
124. Id. at 565.
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"entire act" outweighed the television's First Amendment rights. 25  It
stated: "The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring
respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television
than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner...." ,,
26
Although Zacchini demonstrates that the right of publicity can
outweigh First Amendment interests, 127 its unusual factual setting has
created uncertainty as to how it applies in typical right of publicity actions.
Some portions of the Zacchini decision carefully distinguish between the
economic or property interests which underlie the right of publicity with
the reputation or privacy interests involved in defamation and false light
invasion of privacy claims. 128 Generally, such distinctions apply to every
right of publicity claim, as all seek to protect an individual's economic
interest in the commercial value of his or her identity and reputation.
However, Zacchini also emphasized that the action before it involved
"what may be the strongest case for a 'right of publicity'-involving, not
the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very
activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first
place. ' ' 29 Yet, the Zacchini court emphasized that nothing in its ruling
would have prevented the television station defendant from broadcasting a
news story that merely named the plaintiff and described the act. 30 This
uncertainty has encouraged some lower courts to virtually ignore Zacchini
when evaluating First Amendment defenses to right of publicity claims as
described below.
3. Fair Use
A few courts have attempted to apply copyright law's "fair use"
doctrine to the posthumous right of publicity.1 3' They may have been
125. Id. at 574-75.
126. Id. at 575.
127. Zaechini, 433 U.S. at 574-75, 578-79.
128. See id. at 571-73 (stating "'[t]he interest protected' in permitting recovery for placing
the plaintiff in a false light 'is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental
distress as in defamation.' By contrast the State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in
protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such
entertainment.") (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 576.
130. Id. at 574 (stating that "[i]t is evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that
petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to prevent respondent from reporting the
newsworthy facts about petitioner's act").
131. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 868 F. Supp. 1266,
2003]
492 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:471
encouraged to follow this approach by the statement in Zacchini, quoted
above, that the First Amendment did not permit the right of publicity or the
copyright violation.
These efforts could probably best be characterized as noble failures,
as the factors used in copyright analysis do not readily lend themselves to
right of publicity claims. For example, one of the copyright fair use
factors, "the nature of the copyrighted work," would generally not be
helpful in right of publicity analysis because the identity rights involved
would usually be of the same "nature.' 32 Another factor, "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole,"'133 also would not generally be meaningful, since by definition
there must be a taking of an individual's identity before right of publicity
liability attaches. 3 4 A third factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work,"'135 would routinely favor a
finding of infringement, as Supreme Court authority establishes that an
uncompensated taking will generally have an adverse effect on the market
for commercial exploitation of the celebrity's image. 136 For these reasons,
commentators have advised against adoption of a "fair use" approach in
right of publicity cases.
137
Nevertheless, in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup,'38 the
California Supreme Court recently adopted one of the four fair use factors
as its test to evaluate a First Amendment defense to a right of publicity
claim. 3 9 The court affirmed a right of publicity judgment in favor of the
owners of rights in the Three Stooges against an artist who sold an artistic
rendering of the Three Stooges on t-shirts and posters. 40 The California
Supreme Court described its approach as follows:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or
imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing
1271-72 (N.D. Okla. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose decision applied copyright's fair use criteria to right
of publicity claim to determine no right of publicity liability); Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at
1358 n.18, 1359 n.21 (holding that "fair use" analysis used to determine that Elvis Presley
impersonator's attempt to duplicate a live performance of Elvis Presley violated the right of
publicity and was not protected "speech" under the First Amendment).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 535.
137. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 58, § 8.38.
138. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
139. Id. at 808.
140. Id. at 811.
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on the right of publicity without adding significant expression
beyond that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits
of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the
imitative artist.
On the other hand, when a work contains significant
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First
Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with
the economic interest protected by the right of publicity ....
Accordingly, First Amendment protection of such works
outweighs whatever interest the state may have in enforcing the
right of publicity. 
141
This "transformativeness" test has apparently already proven
problematic. The California Supreme Court has accepted for review the
first lower court decision to apply the "transformativeness" test,
42
implying at least discomfort with the consequences of its formulation. In
an earlier decision, the appellate court in Winter v. D.C. Comics143 ruled
that it could not be determined, as a matter of law, whether defendants' use
of the images and partial names of Johnny and Edgar Winter in a cowboy
science fiction comic book series was sufficiently "transformative" to
defeat a right of publicity claim. 144 Defendants' successful petition for
review to the California Supreme Court 145 essentially argued that the lower
court misinterpreted Comedy III because use of a celebrity identity in
"expressive works of fiction" almost invariably "are entitled to first
amendment protection as a matter of law,"' 46 an argument harking back to
the "media versus merchandise" rulings described above.
4. Malice
The U.S. Supreme Court has both implied and stated that the "malice"
test does not apply in right of publicity actions. 147  For example, in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court rejected a First
Amendment defense as described above, and while the intended breadth of
its ruling is uncertain in many respects, it is clear that the Zacchini Court
141. Id. at 808 (citations omitted).
142. See Winter v. D.C. Comics, 54 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2002) (granting review en banc).
143. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d431 (Ct. App. 2002).
144. Id. at 441-42.
145. Appellant D.C. Comics' Petition for Review, Winter v. D.C. Comics, 54 P.3d 262 (Cal.
2002) (No. 5108751).
146. Id. at 13.
147. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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did not engage in a "malice" analysis. 148 Zacchini even explained at some
length why "malice" was not appropriate in right of publicity cases by
distinguishing between the reputational interests involved in false light
invasion of privacy and economic interests at stake in right of publicity
actions as follows:
[The false light claim in] Time, Inc. v. Hill... involved an
entirely different tort from the "right of publicity".... The
Court was aware that it was adjudicating a "false light" privacy
case involving a matter of public interest, not a case
involving. . . "appropriation" of a name or likeness for the
purposes of trade .... It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc.
v. Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a name having
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of publicity". ...
The differences between these two torts are important.
149
The privacy versus property distinction articulated in Zacchini is
present in every right of publicity action, as described above, implying that
the "malice" analysis is never appropriate for such claims.5 ° The Supreme
Court itself subsequently confirmed that interpretation of Zacchini when it
stated that "the 'actual malice' standard does not apply to the tort of
appropriation of a right of publicity."1
51
This distinction between privacy and defamation claims on the one
hand and right of publicity claims on the other is logical. Defamation and
certain privacy claims involve an individual's reputational interests. Such
interests are not transferable, end upon an individual's death, and therefore
do not rise to the level of property. 52 The right of publicity, on the other
hand, protects an individual's commercial value in his or her identity. It is
property, and thus is entitled to all of the protections the Constitution
affords to property. ' 3 The "malice" standard applied in defamation actions
may be an appropriate way to protect expressive interests when no property
is taken; however, another mode of analysis is needed to protect property
interests when they are at risk.
Three recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, two of which
included false light invasion of privacy claims, nevertheless applied the
"malice" test to right of publicity claims. 54  Eastwood v. National
148. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
149. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 571-73.
150. Id.
151. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52.
152. See MCCARTHY, supra note 58, §§ 9:1, 10:2-10:3.
153. See id.
154. See Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997); Hoffman v. Capital
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Enquirer, Inc., involved a newspaper article that Clint Eastwood alleged
placed him in a false light and violated his right of publicity. 55 Applying
the "malice" standard to that action is understandable because, as described
above, the court was obliged to undertake a "malice" analysis on the false
light claim, and the Ninth Circuit's determination that the "malice"
requirement was satisfied necessarily affirmed the constitutional viability
of the remaining claims.'56
Nevertheless, Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., involved a direct
confrontation between publicity and expressive rights. 157 In that action, a
magazine published a "feature" in which photographs of a variety of
celebrities were altered by a computer to make it appear that they were
wearing Spring 1997 fashions. 58 The manufacturer, price, and availability
were described in text immediately adjacent to the photographs. 59 At least
some of the products depicted were produced by advertisers in the
magazine. One of the altered photographs depicted Dustin Hoffman from
the motion picture Tootsie, and he filed suit alleging unfair competition and
violation of his right of publicity. 60 He was successful in the trial court,
where the court ruled that he had been "violated by technology" and
awarded him $3 million in damages.
161
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a decision that spent surprisingly little
time discussing how it should evaluate the magazine's conduct.' 62  It
simply evaluated whether the above-described use was "commercial
speech," concluded that it was not, and stated that "a public figure such as
Hoffman can recover damages for non-commercial speech from a media
organization.., only by proving 'actual malice'....' 163 It ruled that
Hoffman had not presented "clear and convincing" evidence of actual
malice and reversed.164 The Ninth Circuit's Hoffman ruling did not discuss
or even mention the above-described Supreme Court authority, even
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Solano v. Playgirl, 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.
2002).
155. Nat'l Enquirer, 123 F.3d at 1250.
156. Solano, 292 F.3d 1078 (reversing summary judgment for defendant because of factual
dispute on whether defendant acted with malice in using plaintiff's photograph on cover of
magazine in a way that implied he posed nude inside magazine).
157. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2001).
158. Id. at 1183.
159. Id. at 1185.
160. Id. at 1183.
161. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd, 255
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
162. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001).
163. Id. at 1186.
164. Id. at 1189.
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though it was cited to the court.
165
Additionally, a Missouri appellate court has applied the "malice" test
to a right of publicity action notwithstanding this Supreme Court authority,
with the appellate court essentially holding that the Supreme Court did not
really mean what it said.' 66  Doe v. TCI Cablevision167 held that a
professional hockey player could not recover from a magazine and toy
manufacturer for alleged misappropriation of his name, which was used for
a comic book character and spinoff action figure. 168 The Missouri appellate
court discussed the Zacchini decision at length, ruling that it was limited to
cases involving an individual's "own performance.' ' 169 The court concluded
that the Supreme Court's statement in Hustler that "the 'actual malice'
standard does not apply to the tort of appropriation of right of publicity,"
was intended to apply only to Zacchini-type right of publicity claims.' 70 It
then proceeded to apply the malice test to the action before it.
5. Balancing
Two courts, including Rogers v. Grimaldi discussed above, have
adopted the ad hoc "balancing" test to right of publicity claims.'
7'
"Balancing" has the same difficulties in the right of publicity setting that
are present in the trademark setting described above. Indeed, the only post-
Rogers court to adopt the test in the right of publicity setting implicitly
acknowledged the lack of authority for the approach it borrowed, relying
on dissents to support the "balancing" it advocated. 1
72
6. The "Relatedness" Test
The Restatement of Unfair Competition73 advocates a "relatedness"
test, pursuant to which the use of others' publicity rights in expressive
165. See id. at 1188.
166. See generally N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (stating that malice
deals with the importance of public debate in free society, not property interests).
167. No. ED78785, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1577, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002).
168. See id. at *46-*49.
169. Id. at *27-*31.
170. Id. at *45 n.16.
171. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996).
172. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 836 F.2d at 405-06 (Heany, J.,
dissenting); S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 569-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1993).
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works is permitted if the rights "relate" to the work, but not otherwise.
174
"Use of a [deceased personality's] identity in advertising, magazine or
newspaper articles, biographies, films, or similar works relating to the
identified individual is not an infringement of the right of publicity'
' 75
while, "if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work
that is not related to the identified person, the user may be subject to
liability for the use of the other's identity in advertising."'' 76 Several courts
have applied this "relatedness" test where the First Amendment defenses to
right of publicity claims involved expressive works. 1
77
Most recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court applied a "relatedness"
test to rule that there is no right of publicity violation from the use of a
deceased musical performer's name and likeness in a music video for a
song that was a tribute to the deceased musical performer. 78 This decision
is unusual because it addressed a First Amendment issue that had not been
raised by any of the parties. 179  Perhaps for this reason, the Kentucky
Supreme Court's discussion does not discuss, refer to, or mention any of
the authorities applying different tests as described herein.
174. Id. § 47, Reporter's Note & cmts. a, c.
175. Id. § 47, Reporter's Note cmt. a.
176. Id. § 47, Reporter's Note cmt. c.
177. See, e.g., Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding a
docudrama depicting the Black Panther party and Bobby Scale's participation in the group as
protected by the First Amendment under the Restatement's "relatedness" test because no
alternative means to discuss the matters raised); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 131-
32 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that First Amendment privilege is lost if the use of a name or likeness
"has no real relationship to the discussion, and thus is an advertisement in disguise"); Delan by
Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (App. Div. 1983) ("Of course, there must have
existed a legitimate connection between the use of plaintiff's name and picture and the matter of
public interest sought to be portrayed .... "); Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (App.
Div. 1985) ("to be privileged such use must be legitimately related to the informational value of
the publication and may not be a mere disguised commercialization of a person's personality;"
nude photos of socialite arrested for running prostitution ring not legitimately related to news
story); see also Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979)
(concluding media use of Rudolph Valentino to be appropriate because "this is not a case in
which the use [of the deceased celebrity] is wholly unrelated to the individual. A different result
may follow if, for example, respondents had published Rudolph Valentino's cookbook and
neither the recipes nor the menus described in the book were in any fashion related to Rudolph
Valentino.").
178. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Ky. 2001).
179. See id. at 527.
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7. The "Alternative Means" Test
The "alternative means" test has been discussed in connection with
right of publicity claims,80 but has not yet been adopted. However, the
Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court arguably applied this approach
to a right that is directly analogous to the right of publicity, namely,
statutory rights in the "Olympic" mark in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
as described above.
181
This statutory "Olympic" trademark is directly analogous to the right
of publicity because both establish liability for particular words without
requiring a likelihood of confusion.1 82  Indeed, the Supreme Court's
discussion of the policies underlying the "Olympic" mark in San Francisco
Arts & Athletics quoted from its earlier Zacchini decision in which it
recognized the right of publicity, implied that the Supreme Court believed
the policies underlying the statutory "Olympic" mark and the right of
publicity are at least analogous.'
1 83
V. OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Aside from an unfortunate lack of judicial consistency, what can be
learned from the above survey -of this confusing area of law? Several
principles can be gleaned from extant authority.
First, broad-brush arguments concerning the expansiveness of
"speech" address only half of the issue. The right of publicity-free speech
interface involves not merely the constitutional right to "speak," but also
the right to control one's property. 84  An argument can be made that
Constitutional "speakers" should not be able to "take" and use intellectual
property to enable speech any more than they can take real or tangible
personal property to do so. Intellectual property obviously has more
expressive value than a building or field, but all can be used to
communicate a message. 185  For this reason, all deserve the legal
180. The Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons rejected the "adequate alternative avenues" approach
in favor of ad hoc balancing, but nevertheless applied it to its decision. See Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971-72 (10th Cir. 1996).
181. See Int'l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986);
S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 522.
182. See 36 U.S.C. § 380 (2000); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
183. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 533 (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575).
184. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th
Cir. 1996).
185. Some courts have distinguished intellectual property from other types of property on
the grounds that intellectual property's symbolic value makes it a more important component of
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protections that the Constitution affords.
Second, although the caselaw generally does not express itself in
these terms, the right of publicity should be viewed as, at most, creating a
"content neutral" restriction on speech. It promotes a "substantial
government interest" in recognizing and protecting an individual's
commercial value in his or her identity.186 Right of publicity law often
protects the substantial government interest in circumstances which do not
involve speech. The right of publicity would be much less effective if any
claim to expressive use exempted it from liability. The right of publicity
fits the classic definition of "content neutral" regulations when publicity
rights are being used in a creative work.
187
Third, most courts grappling with this issue have already applied
some variant of intermediate review, although the precise approach varies
according to the case. The Supreme Court's Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.188 decision, "merchandise v. media" caselaw, the
Restatement's "unrelatedness" approach, the "alternative means" approach,
and the San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee'8 9 decision all involve judicial attempts to protect the
commercial value of identity while permitting, where appropriate, the
identity to be used for predominantly expressive purposes.' 
90
Fourth, the "malice" and ad hoc "balancing" approaches utilized by
speech. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971
(10th Cir. 1996). However, some artists consider real property a necessary symbolic component
of their art. For example, prominent artist Christo is well-known for creating artistic works that
require acres of real property. His works include wrapping the Reichstag in a million square feet
of polypropylene fabric in 1995, planting hundreds of umbrellas along the hillsides of California
in 1991, surrounding the Pont Neuf of Paris in 1985 and the island of Biscayne Bay in 1983 with
colored fabric, and his creation of a 24-mile nylon fabric "running fence" in California in 1976.
See Steven R. Weisman, Wrapping the Reichstag, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1995, at 20; L.A TIMES,
June 25, 1995, at A12. Other artists commonly create large murals on the sides of high-rise office
buildings. Thus, an argument that "pure speech" allows the use of another's property would
mean that any artist would have an absolute First Amendment right to trespass on and use that
property to create "art." Courts have rejected such arguments for decades. See, e.g., Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that "crimes and torts committed in
newsgathering are not protected [by the First Amendment]"); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668,
681 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that news organizations that trespassed into a home to photograph
medical procedures was not protected).
186. See ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
307 (2d ed. 2001).
187. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
188. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
189. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
190. See also Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223 (N.J. 1999) (showing court
protection of the expressive idea of the Boy Scouts of America, even though a commercial
entity).
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some courts should be rejected. "Malice" does not recognize the property
interests at stake, and has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the right
of publicity setting.191  "Balancing" lacks substantive content and
encourages uncertainties, which may chill speech by themselves. 
192
Fifth, the fairest way to approach these issues when publicity rights
are being used in a creative work, as well as the approach that best
comports with applicable authority, may be to answer a simple question-
What is being exploited? If a product is being sold that predominantly
exploits the commercial value of an individual's identity, that product
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the
First Amendment, even if there is some "expressive" content in it that
might qualify as "speech" in other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the
predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment on
or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater weight.
Such an approach does justice to both the expressive and property interests.
It protects intellectual property that is being exploited by others, but
permits and encourages creative expression that makes meaningful
comment on, about, or with the intellectual property. It gives deference to
the heightened symbolic content of intellectual property by allowing such
property to be used without compensation in many more circumstances
than is possible with real or tangible personal property.
Such an approach would not be meaningful absent substantive
analytic methodologies to help evaluate a particular use, but such
methodologies are presently available, and have already been used by many
courts. The better judicially developed approaches discussed herein, while
individually unsatisfying or incomplete as described above, can provide
helpful tools for determining whether the publicity right is being exploited
or the individual is being commented on. For example, the "merchandise
v. media" approach can be a practical shortcut to quickly resolve the issue
in many circumstances. While one could argue that a bumper sticker,
swizzle stick, bobblehead doll, or poster includes some expressive content,
most often they predominantly are intended to capitalize on the commercial
value of an individual's identity by permitting the public to purchase a
symbolic representation of that identity. If people buy a picture of Tiger
Woods predominantly because they like Tiger Woods, rather than because
they are attracted to the composition of the picture, that picture should be
deemed to violate Tiger Woods' right of publicity. The "alternative
191. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (stating that malice has to do
with the importance of public debate in free society, not property interests).
192. IDES & MAY, supra note 186, at 320 (stating that uncertainties could "impose a
dangerous chill" on speech).
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means" test can also help a court assess whether publicity rights are being
exploited by determining whether the taking of intellectual property could
have been avoided in the first place. An unnecessary use is more likely to
be an exploitive, and hence actionable, use of the publicity right. The
Restatement's "unrelatedness" test can also help evaluate whether use of an
individual's identity in a work of expression is appropriate by helping to
assess whether the use was intended to make a genuine comment about or
merely to exploit the goodwill of the celebrity. 193 Even the California
Supreme Court's "transformativeness" test can help to determine whether
the use is primarily exploitative or communicative by encouraging judicial
focus on the nature of the use.
194
The above-described approach would, doubtless, be difficult to apply
in many circumstances. However, in contrast to the present approaches it
at least addresses the ultimate question in such cases, and provides
mechanisms by which that question may be answered. It would also be
better than the present judicial confusion that surrounds the issue. On one
hand, continued judicial uncertainty and inconsistency will on the one hand
cause more individuals and companies to exploit other publicity rights in
legally dubious ways. On the other hand, it will chill speech and
impoverish discourse as others avoid potentially harmless references to
individuals. In addition, it will encourage additional litigation as
individuals seek to protect rights of uncertain legal dimensions to prevent
the devaluation of public goodwill that results from widened use of the
intellectual property by third parties. Coherent legal guidelines are needed
to protect individual rights and encourage speech.
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
194. See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
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